This guide, written by an expert in the field, explains how to provide externally controlled access to OWA for users based on Restrictive Windows Groups while allowing all users to connect internally. Particular consideration is given to security and client access and how to configure a Kemp LoadMaster with the Edge Security Pack (ESP) for this environment. This approach ensures that no significant changes need to be made to existing Exchange infrastructure.
Detailed instructions provide a clear roadmap for configuring two RADIUS based Single Sign On (SSO) authentication domains within the LoadMaster, plus the subsequent steps to configure and test internal and external user access.
Several design models were taken into account for this request, however security is of the utmost concern so easy things like direct connection from the DMZ into the internal LAN were skipped although they would probably still be considered secure.
Kemp ESP v2 does not support linked mailboxes. This document describes how to overcome that limitation..
To provide the necessary authentication and group based access control, for users who are accessing OWA from anywhere internally or externally.
Additionally OWA has to work internally and cannot be denied using options in Exchange.
Note: All
have to pass ExCRA analyzer, and allow users access based on location and group.
The solution is described in the following steps:
Red Showing External Traffic and Auth Routing (External RADIUS)
Blue Showing access path after Auth has been completed
Green Showing Internal Traffic
Blue Showing Access to Exchange
For this portion of the document we will quickly cover the Key Configuration Points of TMG. The reason why we’re using both TMG and Kemp is simply to provide additional security. TMG Itself is not required to implement this solution and should be considered optional.
You could setup the following configuration
Basic TMG Rule Set:
Showing Rules defined for my current TMG environment, your rule set may look different, you may have more rules or less rules it depends on how you configured TMG for your Environment
This Rule uses the following settings:
Since we are leveraging Kemp, ESP and RADIUS were not going to use any of the advanced Auth features of TMG.
Showing no AUTH performed by TMG.
This Rule uses the following settings:
Since we are leveraging Kemp, ESP and RADIUS were not going to use any of the advanced Auth features of TMG.
Showing no AUTH performed by TMG
This Rule uses the following settings:
Since we are leveraging Kemp, ESP and RADIUS were not going to use any of the advanced Auth features of TMG.
Showing no AUTH performed by TMG
The listener here is normally used to present the TMG form. However in this case were not using any TMG specific features and are instead just using the Kemp solution.
DNS from TMG to network for autodiscover.ntkrnl.com
This is how TMG sends the “External Traffic” to the External VIP.
The first step because we know this works and because we’re assuming that you have not done any work on this yet is to setup the 2 Windows RADIUS server.
I used 2 separate Windows 2008 Domain Controllers, https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc771746(v=ws.10).aspx this worked well for me when tested in a lab environment.
This document will quickly cover just the steps necessary to configure the RADIUS server, policies and add the necessary clients.
Remember that in my scenario traffic routes like so:
By the time traffic hits the Domain Controllers (RADIUS servers) the source IP is always the Kemp and not the original client, the TMG server or any other firewall. For the Kemp to work correctly you have to enable ESP Re-Encrypt (in this scenario).
This part is simple; we simply add the >load balancers Source IP to the Allowed list of clients on both RADIUS servers. (Repeat on each Server until you have the same client added to both servers)
Network Policy Server
and Choose
Adding RADIUS Client to RADIUS server
I recommend using a 22 Character or better password for your RADIUS Shared Secret; this is per Microsoft’s documentation and is done in an effort to reduce Hash Cracking viability against the RADIUS Messages. https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc740124(v=ws.10).aspx
Note: Try to use longer passwords that avoid
- I found in some cases using passwords that are either too long or use punctuation characters would create failed logons.
I’ve found that using PC Tools for Windows
is the best at creating passwords that are sufficiently complex.
https://secure.pctools.com/guides/password
This is the internal Policy
Right Click >> New
Type the
and Click Next
Click Add
Click >> Add Groups
Select the group you previously created (not covered in this document) and add that group to this policy, the group should be a (domain local group), this is where the actual work is done; any group added here will allow member’s access to OWA and ECP internally.
Click >> Ok
Select >> Access Granted >> Click >> Next
Then select the authentication type
Shown below:
You want to select “Unencrypted Authentication” (PAP/SPAP) – The password is hashed in part with the
you created when you setup the
, this is
and is not by itself the most secure thing that ever was, however auth traffic only passes from the Kemp (Client) to the Domain Controller that data contains the username in
– but as mentioned the password is encrypted.
Additionally since the data is only passing from the Kemp (RADIUS Client) to the Domain Controller and since that is all on the internal LAN side,
You will see the following Dialog Box pop up
Then you will see this
Then you will see this
Then you will see this
We’re now done with the First Policy, Create the same policy on the other RADIUS Server.
Create 2 separate SSO domains on the LoadMAster for users to gain network access via OWA/ECP. This step is crucial but not difficult.
Browse to the Kemp WUI and then go to the following:
Manage SSO
We’re looking at the following “Client Single Sign-On Configurations”
Type in the name (either) ext.domain or int.domainAdd
Select
Authentication Protocol
Type in the IP address which will be used for the “Internal VIP” or in this case the “External VIP” – for me the Domain Controller that will be providing Auth for the
will be 192.168.125.2
Adding the shared secret and the RADIUS servers IP is all that’s needed here, adding the domain/realm is unnecessary.
(Same process as above, showing the Internal VIP)
Showing separate RADIUS Server which will be used by the internal VIP.
Now were going to look at which policies apply where. This will be the final step in attaching the right Auth methods. First we need to discuss the firewall and DNS policies.
Let’s take a look at how the Kemp is routing traffic internally and externally
View/Modify Services
Click on the NTKRNL-OWA2-Internal VIPFor
to work correctly you need to
“SSL Acceleration” Enabled and “Re-encrypt”. ESP is the whole reason why we are setting this up the way we are. For ESP to work correctly the Kemp has to be able to decrypt and then re-encrypt the traffic.
ESP Options (Not Selected)
Notice that ESP Is not enabled here, that is because it will be enabled on the SubVs.
Client Auth Mode is
Server Auth Mode is
Setting up the Kemp itself is outside of the scope of this document. But we do need to touch on a few items here in order to make sure this project works correctly.
OWA and ESP
Modify
Make sure to set the Correct SSO Domain and the Correct URLs, Correct Allowed vDirs, and Auth mode.
Now we add the “Real Servers”
Click >> Add New
Click Ok
The real server has now been added, we’ve added the Exchange Server here and not a domain controller.
Showing Internal Traffic Routing
{Internal LAN} >> DNS 192.168.50.229 >> NTKRNL-OWA-Internal (VIP) >> Exchange CAS servers
. This solves the “how do I” allow all users internal access to OWA while blocking them from accessing OWA externally this is done via allowing
Showing External Traffic Routing
This is different than the above because traffic actually goes like this:
{Internet (WAN)} >> DMZ (TMG) >> (TMG >> Kemp VIP) >> Kemp (CAS) >> Exchange 2010 CAS Servers
That’s it!!
The traffic from the internet is routed through the DMZ to the TMG server and then to the Kemp (VIP) that authenticates correctly the externally configured “Allowed” group in the 2nd RADIUS server.
Each Step is shown above to make it easier to follow.
This will show how it works when a domain user is allowed via the internal policy. All users should be added here to ensure that your users won’t experience connectivity issues.
Hostname: Server1 (DC)
IP: 192.168.50.77
Zone: (LAN) Internal, VIP Internal
Groups:
Allowed Groups in the “Corp\Allowed”
I have several Groups, but Domain Users worked fine as well. Notice the CRossForest user; this is where linked mailboxes users are allowed to connect,
This will show how it works when a domain user is allowed via the External Policy. The key point here is the RADIUS server controls user access based on group regardless of the other RADIUS servers Groups / Settings.
Hostname: Server2 (DC)
IP: 192.168.125.2
Zone: (LAN) Internal, VIP External
Groups:
Allowed Groups in the “Corp\Allowed-External”
I only have a few users listed here and those users are the only ones allowed to connect externally. All other users are denied because they do not match. Notice the cross forest user; this is where linked mailboxes users are allowed to connect,
Exchange Remote Connectivity Analyzer showing that all client connectivity is successful for both (Corp.local) accounts and (contoso. Local) accounts.
contoso\cfntkcr3
user password
Linked (Account forest: Contoso.local) – Mailbox Forest (Corp.local)
ExCRA for AS:
ExCRA for EWS:
ExCRA for OA:
Using an linked mailbox account
Corp\CorpRobert2
user password
Local (Account Forest, User Forest = Same Forest)
ExCRA for OA:
ExCRA for EWS:
ExCRA for AS:
Using a local mailbox account
Notes: